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The imperative of sustainability requires sustaining nature’s functioning and services for
humans over the long run. There is a broad and diverse discussion about how exactly
to deﬁne, operationalize and measure sustainability (surveyed e.g. by Heal 1998, Klauer
1999, Neumayer 2003, Pezzey 1992), reﬂecting the breadth and diversity of ideas about
(i) what exactly is the normative content of sustainability and (ii) how exactly can the
structure and functioning of ecological-economic systems be described.
In this discussion, a distinction has been made between so-called ‘weak’ and ‘strong’
sustainability (Neumayer 2003). Both positions presume that human well-being derives
from services that are provided by diﬀerent kinds of natural, manufactured and human
capital, and that intergenerational fairness requires that this capital basis – which makes
the opportunity set for present and future generations – is not to be diminished over
time. Against this background, weak sustainability holds that the aggregate capital
stock is not to be diminished, while strong sustainability holds that the various stocks
of (critical) natural and economic (i.e. manufactured and human) capital are to be
conserved separately. Strong sustainability, thus, does not allow that, say, a decrease in
natural capital is made up by an increase in economic capital.
Strong sustainability is motivated by a belief that natural and economic capital are
only to a limited extent substitutable against each other. Furthermore, as there is huge
uncertainty about the preferences of future generations as well as about the exact func-
tional relationships that govern ecological-economic interactions and the provision of
services from diﬀerent types of capital, precautionary responsibility and intergenera-
tional fairness towards future generations require, according to this position, that the
various stocks of natural and economic capital should be conserved separately (Daly and
Cobb 1989, Ekins et al. 2003, Ott and D¨ oring 2004, Pearce at al. 1989).
As uncertainty is one of the essential challenges of the long run, and sustainability
is – by any deﬁnition – about the long run, the question arises of how to deﬁne and
operationalize sustainability under uncertainty. Weak sustainability has been conceptu-
alized as non-declining welfare over time, which can be operationalized with reference to
2the net change in the total value of various stocks of natural and economic capital (e.g.
Arrow et al. 2003, Asheim 1994, Hamilton 1994, Pearce and Atkinson 1993, Pezzey and
Withagen 1995). This approach has been extended to conditions of uncertainty, where
sustainability is typically conceptualized as non-declining expected welfare (Asheim and
Brekke 2002, Beltratti et al. 1998, Howarth 1995, Tucci 1998a,b, Woodward 2000).
Strong sustainability, in contrast, has so far not been operationalized under conditions
of uncertainty. While the whole concept can be seen as an approach to dealing with
fundamental uncertainty about the future, where neither future preferences nor even
the potential ‘states of the world’ are known, it has not been formulated in a more
concrete manner under weaker forms of uncertainty, i.e. where probability distributions
over known states of the world are known.1
In this paper, we propose to use the ecological-economic concept of viability as a
criterion of strong sustainability under uncertainty. Viability, loosely speaking, means
that the diﬀerent components and functions of a dynamic, stochastic system at any
time remain in a domain where the future existence of these components and functions
is guaranteed with suﬃciently high probability. The idea of viability is known in diﬀerent
academic disciplines. For example, in ecology a species’ population is called viable if its
probability of survival over a given time horizon is higher than a predeﬁned threshold
value (Soul´ e 1987, Beissinger and McCullough 2002, Frank 2005). This understanding
of viability pertains to the continued existence of certain natural capital stocks. As
another example, in economics and ﬁnance an enterprise or management action is called
viable if it continually generates a cash ﬂow higher than a certain predeﬁned level.
This understanding of viability pertains to the continued existence of certain services
ﬂowing from capital stocks. Also, a mathematical theory of viability been developed
for conditions of certainty (Aubin 1991) and applied to ecological, environmental and
resource economic problems (B´ en´ e and Doyen 2000, B´ en´ e et al. 2001, Doyen and B´ en´ e
2003, Pereau submitted, Martinet and Doyen 2007, Eisenack et al. 2006). While all
these disciplinary conceptualizations capture some aspects of the basic idea of viability,
1For a detailed discussion of diﬀerent forms of uncertainty, that is inspired by Knight (1921), see
Faber et al. (1992).
3they diﬀer to various degrees in exactly what aspects of this idea they capture, and how,
and, therefore, in their substantive content.
In this paper, we develop a general formalization of ecological-economic systems
as stochastic dynamic networks of funds and services. On this basis, we conceptualize
strong sustainability under uncertainty as ecological-economic viability. In particular, we
develop a general and unifying ecological-economic concept of viability that encompasses
the traditional ecological and economic notions of viability – continued existence of
stocks and of services, respectively – as special cases. In so doing, we identify and discuss
the various normative judgments that necessarily enter the concept. The ecological-
economic concept of viability thus obtained provides an operational criterion of strong
sustainability under conditions of uncertainty. It should thus help to better understand
and devise sustainability policy, such as e.g. the so-called ‘tolerable windows approach’
that has been proposed as an approach to climate policy (Bruckner et al. 1999, 2003,
T´ oth et al. 2002).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explicate in a general, abstract,
and formal manner the structure and functioning of ecological-economic systems in terms
of funds (i.e. capital stocks) and services. On this basis, we formally deﬁne ecological-
economic viability and discuss the properties of this deﬁnition in Section 3. In Section 4,
we illustrate this concept and demonstrate its usefulness by applying it to the example
of livestock grazing management in semi-arid rangelands. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Formal description of ecological-economic systems
as dynamic networks of funds and services
The interrelationship between human economies and natural ecosystems comprises in-
teractions on a wide range of diﬀerent spatial and temporal scales. As a result, changes
in one system may generate impacts in the other system and, in general, the subsequent
changes have repercussions back on the system where the changes originated (Dasgupta
et al. 2000, Norgaard 1981, Perrings 1998, Settle et al. 2002). In order to gain a com-
4prehensive understanding of how human economic activity over time depends on and
interferes with natural ecosystems, it is therefore necessary to employ models that cap-
ture the relevant internal structure and dynamics of both economies and ecosystems as
well as their interaction in a unifying way (Costanza et al. 1993, Faber et al. 1996).
A particularly well suited starting point for a unifying representation of ecological
and economic systems, as well as their interaction, is the observation that, in some
sense, both systems consist of entities that render services for others. While this idea is
quite obvious for economic systems, it may be applied to ecosystems and to economy-
environment interactions as well. For example, one may think of an ecological food
chain as a ﬂow of service from resource to consumer, of ‘ecosystem services’ which are
used and valued by economic agents (Daily 1997, Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
2005), or of economic agents ‘investing in natural capital’ (Jansson 1994).
This idea has been captured in a Theory of Funds by Faber et al. (1995) and (Faber
and Manstetten 1998, 2003: Chapters 8, 9), which aims to provide a unifying conceptual
framework for the description and analysis of ecological-economic systems and which is
rooted in natural philosophy. A fund, in this framework, is an entity that gives some-
thing, but at the same time it is maintained or maintains itself. A fund is characterized
by the following two characteristic properties:2
(i) A fund renders services to one or more other funds.3
(ii) A fund persists, as it maintains and reproduces itself, or it is maintained. Hence,
it exists over a time scale that is not a priori limited.
A typical example of a fund is the population of some biological species. Also, the stock
of some capital good or human societies may be seen as funds.
Formally and quantitatively, a fund can be described as the stock of something, e.g.
the population of some biological species (measured in number of individuals or in total
biomass) or the stock of some capital good (measured in physical or monetary units).
2The concept of funds, giving rise to ﬂows of services, has been developed and applied to an
ecological-economic analysis of economic production by Georgescu-Roegen (1971: Chap. IX).
3Rendering services does not need to be an intention of the fund.
5The stock concept captures the permanency and the inertia in the dynamics of limited
homogeneous entities (Faber et al. 2005, Faber and Manstetten 2003: Chap. 9). A stock
can be quantiﬁed at any point in time by so-called stock-variables. It exhibits a certain
dynamics over time which is determined by internal dynamics, external relationships and
chance inﬂuences. Such dynamics can be formally expressed by dynamic relationships
for the stock variables, e.g. diﬀerence or diﬀerential equations, or algorithmic rules.
A fund that can formally and quantitatively be represented by a (set of) stock vari-
able(s) is what economists traditionally call capital, or, more exactly, a capital good
(Baumg¨ artner et al. 2006: Chap. 4). While the traditional perspective of economics is
that a capital good is intentionally produced by human activity so as to render pro-
ductive services, the notion of capital has already been generalized to include so-called
capital bads – which render disservices, e.g. pollutant stocks – and natural capital –
which is not intentionally produced by human activity, yet renders productive and con-
sumptive services to humans.
With this terminology, we can conceptualize an ecological-economic system as a
network of funds; each fund is described by a set of stock variables; and the funds are
connected by the services they render to each other.
This notion of an ecological-economic system is similar to the ecosystem network
theory that has been used in ecology (e.g. Ulanowizc 1986, 1997, Wulﬀ et al. 1989) and
to ideas underlying the integrated modeling of ecological-economic systems (e.g. Eichner
and Pethig 2005, 2006, 2007, Finnoﬀ and Tschirhart 2003, Tschirhart 2000, 2003). In
ecology the network is usually taken to be one of ﬂows of energy or matter. It can
conveniently be interpreted as a network of feeding relations, i.e. as a food web. The
nodes are the populations of species or abiotic stocks of nutrients, and the links are the
nutrient ﬂows. Our conceptualization may be regarded as a generalization of the idea of
a food web in two respects: (i) We allow to also include economic funds. (ii) We allow
for a variety of qualitatively diﬀerent services. These services can, but do not need to
be, ﬂows of energy or matter. For example, they can include the productive services of
capital or knowledge.
In the following, we formalize the funds-services description of an ecological-economic
6system as a dynamic network of multi-functional funds and services.
An ecological-economic system, in this formalization, consists of n ≥ 2 diﬀerent









Figure 1: Graphical illustration of the ecological-economic system as a network of funds
and services.
be represented as boxes (i.e. to symbolize the stock-like character of the funds) and the
services may be represented as arrows between the boxes. In Figure 1, diﬀerent types
of services are denoted by diﬀerent colors.4
The dynamic development of the system is considered in continuous time, t ∈ [0,∞),
from the present, t = 0, into the inﬁnite future, t → ∞. The characteristics of each of
the n funds Fi (i = 1,...,n) of the system are described by l ≥ 1 diﬀerent stock variables,
denoted by fh
i (t) ∈ IR (h = 1,...,l). That is, each fund can have one, several or all of the l
characteristics. When analyzing a particular system, the l diﬀerent stocks characterizing
the funds Fi have to be chosen so as to fully represent all important features of the funds
under consideration. In total, we thus consider n × l stock variables in the system. At







nl. Some of these quantities may be equal to zero for
4The notation used in the ﬁgure is explained in the following.
7some time.
There are m ≥ 1 types of services Sk (k = 1,...,m). Each type of service can, in
principle, be provided by every fund to every other fund. The ﬂow of service type k
between funds Fi and Fj is denoted by sk
ij(t) ∈ IR.5 Note that the diﬀerent types of
services do not need to coincide with the diﬀerent characteristics of the funds, i.e. m
does not need to be equal to l.6 In this setting, an ecosystem service is a service relation
between a fund, which is part of the ecological subsystem, and another fund, which is
part of the economic subsystem. When analyzing a particular system, it is important
to identify the services that are important for deﬁning the system functionally. In
particular, the analyst’s decision as to where to draw the system boundary determines
which service relationships are endogenous in the ecological-economic system and what
is an exogenous inﬂuence on the system. At each point in time, all endogenous service
relationships between all funds are thus described by n×n×m real numbers. In other





nnm. Some of these quantities may be equal to zero for some time.
At each point in time t, the ecological-economic system is completely described by the
state of the system f(t) and the services tensor s(t). We denote the dynamic trajectory
of the system over the whole time horizon by ξ ≡ {f(t),s(t)}∞
t=0 and the set of all
possible dynamic trajectories by Ξ. Dynamic trajectories need not be continuous. In
fact, the viability analysis that we are developing in this paper in no way hinges upon
continuity assumptions.
Under conditions of uncertainty, the actual dynamic trajectory of the system is
not known in advance. Adopting the particular notion of uncertainty that has been
termed ‘risk’ by Knight (1921) or Faber et al. (1992), we assume that the set of all
5Rather than considering only net service ﬂows, we explicitly distinguish between in and out ﬂows,
because the in and out ﬂows of one particular service for one particular fund may take place on diﬀerent
time scales. Thus, the in and out ﬂows may have diﬀerent inﬂuences on the dynamics of the fund.
6In this respect, our framework is more general than the notion of Georgescu-Roegen (1971: 223)
that ‘a ﬂow [service] is a stock [fund] spread out over time’.
7More exactly, s is a tensor of third order.
8possible dynamic trajectories Ξ is known and that for each possible dynamic trajectory
ξ ∈ Ξ the probability density is known with which it will actually occur, that is, the
probability distribution of all possible dynamic trajectories is known. We denote the set
of all probability distributions on Ξ by Π(Ξ).
The central aim of the formalization is to provide a conceptual framework which al-
lows a sound sustainability assessment. But what is the subject of such a sustainability
assessment? In order to derive results that are relevant for policy and the management
of ecological-economic systems, we shall focus on human actions. Given a human action
that aﬀects the ecological-economic system, we want to assess whether the system’s dy-
namic development can be deemed sustainable or not. In order to assess how a human
action aﬀects sustainability, we have to consider changes in the action under considera-
tion. Hence, the action cannot be an endogenous part of the ecological-economic system.
In order to distinguish the particular human action that is subject to the sustainabil-
ity assessment from all other human actions that are endogenous parts of the system
under study, we shall refer to this particular human action as a project and denote it
by x = {x(t)}∞
t=0. This is a very general description of feasible projects. Of course, a
project may start at some future point in time, or it may end within ﬁnite time. It may
also be a one-time action. In such cases, x(t) = 0 for all times t except for those periods
during which the project actually occurs. The set of all feasible projects is X.
Generalizing the framework of Arrow et al. (2003), who do not consider uncertainty,
we deﬁne a dynamic allocation mechanism α as the mapping that assigns to each initial
state f(0) ∈ IR
nl of the ecological-economic system a probability distribution over all
possible dynamic trajectories. As a project will alter the dynamics of the system, the
dynamic allocation mechanism depends on the project:
α(x) : IR
nl → Π(Ξ) . (1)
This is a very general description of the system’s dynamics. The only underlying as-
sumption is that the probability distribution of the system’s future development may be
completely derived from the present state of the system. This means in particular, we
assume that there is no explicit direct dependency on the state of funds and services at
9times t0 ≤ −1. That is, we consider dynamics of the Markovian type. Also, we neglect
the occurrence of evolution and novelty in our framework.
The dynamic allocation mechanism includes all endogenous ecological and economic
dynamic mechanisms, the dynamic interactions and feedbacks between ecological and
economic mechanisms in the system, as well as exogenous inﬂuences on the funds and
services under study. Of course, for the sake of any concrete analysis, the dynamic
allocation mechanism has to be speciﬁed. In many ecological models, for example,
the probability distribution of dynamic trajectories is determined by a set of stochastic
diﬀerential equations, individual-based models or cellular automata with some stochastic
elements. In many models of environmental and resource economics, as another example,
it is frequently assumed that resources are allocated in an optimal way. Other economic
models assume that resources are allocated through the decisions of boundedly rational
agents, or that perfectly rational agents’ decisions are distorted through various forms of
market imperfections. Again, the description (1) of the system’s dynamics is so general
that it can accommodate for any of those particular dynamic mechanisms.
Summing up, in our formalization an ecological-economic system is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 (ecological-economic system)
An ecological-economic system E is given by (i) n funds Fi and m services Sk, (ii) an
initial state f(0) and (iii) a dynamic allocation mechanism α(x) : IR
nl → Π(Ξ).
3 Deﬁnition of ecological-economic viability
Based on the description of an ecological-economic system as developed in the previous
section, we can now deﬁne ecological-economic viability. Again, we shall focus on the
consequences of a particular human action (‘project’) and deﬁne the viability of a project
for a given ecological-economic system.
Deﬁnition 2 (viability)
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for all (g,h,i,j,k) ∈ G × H × I × J × K and all t ∈ [0,T], (2)
In short: ‘x is ( ¯ f,p, ¯ s,q,T)−viable’ in system E.
We would like to highlight some properties of this notion of ecological-economic viability.
• The essential element in our formalization of viability through Deﬁnition 2 are the
various thresholds and corresponding probability thresholds. In the most general
understanding of viability, a project must lead to dynamic trajectories that respect
thresholds with respect to all funds and services of the system. As a special case,
some of these thresholds may be set equal to zero, so that they are trivially fulﬁlled.
• The requirement that certain funds and services are sustained at levels greater
than given threshold values reﬂects the underlying normative judgement that these
funds and services are in some sense valuable and desired. In contrast, one may also
think about nuisance funds and the dis-services they render, such as the stock of
some pollutant and the environmental and health damages that it generates. One
would want to keep such undesired funds and services at levels smaller than given
threshold values. This can easily be brought under the formalism introduced here
by the convention that undesired funds and services are represented by negative
values of the corresponding stock or ﬂow variables.
• Another essential element in the deﬁnition is the time horizon that has to be
speciﬁed for an operational criterion of viability. As a result, it is possible that
a project is found to be viable for some time horizon but not for another time
horizon, or vice versa.
In principle, the time horizon could be set to inﬁnity. Yet, in this case, the proba-
bility that the funds and services under consideration are sustained at levels greater
11than the required threshold values over the entire time horizon may decrease to
zero. That is, over an inﬁnite time horizon most, if not all, feasible project may
turn out to be not viable irrespective of the concrete threshold values.
• Deﬁnition 2 constitutes a formal notion of viability, not a substantive one, in
that it remains completely open at what levels the thresholds, probability thresh-
olds and time horizon should be actually set. A substantive idea of viability will
specify these levels, and the formal notion developed here can then be used to
operationalize such a substantive idea of viability.
• In Deﬁnition 2 we do not distinguish between threshold values (for stocks, ser-
vices or probabilities) that are justiﬁed by some objective threshold-like behavior
of the system’s dynamics and such thresholds that are purely set due to some
normative decision of society. Ultimately, every threshold that is employed in
this ecological-economic viability criterion involves normative judgments. Thus,
ecological-economic viability analysis always involves normative aspects.
• The notion of viability speciﬁed by Deﬁnition 2 is a uniﬁed and general ecological-
economic notion. As it includes both funds and services, it comprises as special
cases the notions of viability that are traditionally used in ecology (based on funds)
and in economics (based on services). If we consider only ecological funds, i.e. pop-
ulations of some species in an ecosystem, and thresholds for these funds, viability
according to Deﬁnition 2 is exactly equivalent to ecological population viability
analysis (Soul´ e 1987, Beissinger and McCullough 2002, Frank 2005), which is con-
cerned with the preservation of one or several funds. If we consider only the service
of cash ﬂow of an enterprise, and a corresponding threshold value, Deﬁnition 2 is
exactly equivalent to the notion of economic/ﬁnancial viability, which is based
solely on this particular service.
• Generalizing existing concepts of viability to the one given in Deﬁnition 2, one
could go one step further and allow for time-dependent threshold values of ¯ f, p,
¯ s and q. For example, decreasing probability thresholds over time could repre-
12sent some form of discounting of future risks. While this generalization would be
straightforward in formal terms, we believe that constant threshold values better
correspond to the idea of strong sustainability according to which funds and ser-
vices should be sustained above critical levels that are given irrespective of, say,
short-term subjective valuations.
• Under conditions of certainty, viability as speciﬁed by Deﬁnition 2 reduces to the
established notion of strong sustainability: Let G and H be the list of various
stocks of (critical) natural and economic (i.e. manufactured and human) capital




g∈G be the current stocks. Criterion 2 of ecological-economic
viability requires that these stocks have to be conserved separately – which is ex-
actly what strong sustainability requires. Deﬁnition 2 goes beyond the established
idea of strong sustainability, though, in that it may also require to preserve some
of the services above some minimal level.
• Note that under uncertainty, viability is an ex-ante criterion: the probability in
Condition (2) is a probability given all current knowledge, i.e. at time t = 0. It
may well be that the dynamic trajectory under a viable project (sensu Deﬁnition 2)
actually fails to exceed the thresholds ¯ f and ¯ s; and also the other way round, a
project that is not viable ex ante according to Deﬁnition 2 may, due to good luck,
actually turn out to render a dynamic trajectory that exceeds the thresholds ¯ f
and ¯ s over the whole time horizon.
While one may criticize Deﬁnition 2 for its property that it may classify projects
ex ante as viable that ex post turn out to be actually not viable, one should bear in
mind that it is a fundamental property of all systems under uncertainty that one
simply cannot guarantee that certain outcomes will be realized. In this sense, the
criterion of strong sustainability under conditions of certainty – that some entities
are sustained at levels greater than some threshold value – can simply not be met
at 100% certainty under conditions of uncertainty.
• Obviously, the criterion of ecological-economic viability depends on a number of
13normative decisions. It has to be decided upon what shall be sustained in four
respects: (i) Which are the relevant funds and their characteristics, and which are
the relevant types of services and between which funds; (ii) which are the threshold
levels for the selected funds and services; (iii) which are the threshold levels for
the probabilities; and (iv) which is the relevant time horizon.
We call the set of all feasible projects that are viable for a given system and given
viability criteria ( ¯ f,p, ¯ s,q,T) the viability set of the system.
Deﬁnition 3 (viability set)
The viability set VE is the set of all feasible projects x ∈ X which are viable in E:




x is ( ¯ f,p, ¯ s,q,T) − viable in E
	
. (3)
Note that the viability set, according to this deﬁnition, may well be empty. Depending
on the threshold values for stocks, ¯ f, services, ¯ s, or the corresponding probability thresh-
olds, p and q, the initial state f(0) of the system or the dynamic allocation mechanism
α may be such that no viable project exists.
On the other hand, under Deﬁnition 2, for any given ecological-economic system E
and for given viability criteria ( ¯ f,p, ¯ s,q,T), many diﬀerent projects may turn out to
be viable, so that the viability set contains many projects. Then we may go one step
further and exclude from the set of all viable projects those which are dominated by
others in terms of viability. To deﬁne dominance, we consider for a give system the set
of all possible dynamic trajectories that have a non-zero probability weight for a given
project, Ψ(x) = {ξ ∈ Ξ|Prob(ξ) > 0 in system E under project x}. Using this notation,
dominance is deﬁned in the following way.
Deﬁnition 4 (dominance)
Given an ecological-economic system E, a selection of funds and services G,I,J ⊆
{1,...,n}, H ⊆ {1,...,l}, K ⊆ {1,...,m}, and a time horizon T, the project ˆ x ∈ X
dominates the project x ∈ X in system E if and only if for all (ˆ ξ,ξ) ∈ Ψ(ˆ x) × Ψ(x) the
14following holds:
1. ˆ fh
g (t) ≥ fh





for all (g,h,i,j,k) ∈ G × H × I × J × K and all t ∈ [0,T]
and (4)
2. ˆ fh
g (t) > fh





for at least one (g,h) ∈ G × H or one (i,j,k) ∈ I × J × K,
and at least one t ∈ [0,T] .
This notion of dominance is very strong. In particular, if Ψ(ˆ x)∪Ψ(x) 6= ∅, that is, if there
exist dynamic trajectories that have non-zero probability weight under both projects ˆ x
and x, ˆ x cannot dominate x because when considering one of those trajectories the strict
inequality of Condition (4) would be violated.
Deﬁnition 2 of viability as well as the dominance criterion (Deﬁnition 4), constitute
ordinal criteria of viability: they establish a partial rank ordering among all feasible
projects. They do not, by themselves, allow one to make quantitative comparisons
among projects in terms of viability, or even to establish, in general, a full rank ordering
among all feasible projects. For making quantitative sustainability assessments, and for
ordering projects that do not dominate one another, it is therefore helpful to also have
a cardinal measure of viability. Based on Deﬁnition 2, the following cardinal measure
of viability appears plausible.
Deﬁnition 5 (degree of viability)
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The function v(·) is called viability function.
15In general, the viability function will yield values between 0 (not viable at all) and
1 (fully viable). It can be used to quantitatively assess individual projects, and to rank
two projects in terms of their viability even if there is no dominance relation between
them. Using the minimum function, with the threshold conditions for the various funds
and services as arguments, expresses the idea of strong sustainability that each fund
and service should be maintained separately. So, only the minimal degree of threshold
fulﬁllment is counted for the overall value of the viability function.8
Under conditions of certainty the viability function can be either one or zero, v(x) = 1
or v(x) = 0, because either the threshold values are exceeded or not for a certain dynamic
trajectory. In other words, under conditions of certainty a project can be either viable,
i.e. strongly sustainable, or not, i.e. unsustainable.
There are some obvious relationship between the cardinal degree of viability (Deﬁni-
tion 5) and absolute viability as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 2. First of all, a project can only
be viable (in the absolute sense of Deﬁnition 2) if its (cardinal) degree of viability is
greater than some minimum value. This minimum degree of viability that is necessary
(yet, not suﬃcient) for a project to be viable in the absolute sense is simply given by
the smallest probability threshold employed for deﬁning absolute viability.
Lemma 1





















i∈I,j∈J, where G,I,J ⊆ {1,...,n}, H ⊆ {1,...,l},
K ⊆ {1,...,m}, and a time horizon T, a necessary – yet, not suﬃcient – condition for










Proof: see Appendix A.1.
8Obviously, writing the viability function v(·) as a simple (normalized) sum of these arguments
would express the idea of weak sustainability were the preservation of individual funds or services can
be traded oﬀ against each other.
16Moreover, a suﬃcient condition for a project to be viable (in the absolute sense
of Deﬁnition 2) is that its (cardinal) degree of viability exceeds some minimum value
that is higher than the one speciﬁed in Condition (6). In fact, the minimum degree of
viability that is suﬃcient (yet, not necessary) for a project to be viable in the absolute
sense is simply given by the largest probability threshold employed for deﬁning absolute
viability.
Lemma 2





















i∈I,j∈J, where G,I,J ⊆ {1,...,n}, H ⊆ {1,...,l},
K ⊆ {1,...,m}, and a time horizon T, a suﬃcient – yet, not necessary – condition for










Proof: see Appendix A.2.
4 Illustrative example: Livestock grazing manage-
ment in semi-arid rangelands
In order to illustrate the conceptual framework and the concept of viability, and to
demonstrate that it is operational and useful, we now consider the example of livestock
grazing management in semi-arid rangelands. This is a prime object of study for ecolog-
ical economics, as the ecological and economic systems are tightly coupled (e.g. Beukes
et al. 2002, Heady 1999, Janssen et al. 2004, Perrings 1997, Perrings and Walker 1997,
Perrings and Walker 2004, Westoby et al. 1989). The grass biomass is directly used as
forage for livestock, which is the main source of income; and the grazing pressure from
livestock farming directly inﬂuences the ecological dynamics. The crucial link is the
grazing management.
Uncertainty plays a major role in semi-arid rangelands, as the dynamics of ecosys-
tems in semi-arid regions are essentially driven by low and highly variable precipitation
17(Behnke et al. 1993, Sullivan and Rhode 2002, Westoby et al. 1989). Uncertain precip-
itation also is of major economic signiﬁcance, as it poses an income risk to the farmer.
In this respect, the grazing management constitutes some form of ecological-economic
risk management (Quaas et al. 2007).
In a given managed rangeland system a particular change in the grazing management
strategy can be considered as a ‘project’, and we shall assess here whether such a project
is viable or not. The grazing management strategy we consider is a speciﬁc rotational
resting scheme (Heady 1999, M¨ uller et al. 2007, Quaas et al. 2007): in years with high
precipitation a certain fraction of the pasture is given a rest, i.e. the stocking rate is less
than the carrying capacity of the pasture in that year. In years with low precipitation
stocking is adapted to the available forage on the whole pasture.
The rotational resting strategy with resting in years with high rainfall combines two
advantages: (i) It provides a form of ‘natural insurance’ to the farmer – income is shifted
from good years to bad years by building up the vegetation’s stock of reserve biomass in
years with suﬃcient rainfall, which can then be used in years with insuﬃcient rainfall.
(ii) Resting in years with high rainfall is particularly eﬀective in building up reserve
biomass. Thus, a strategy with resting in years with suﬃcient rainfall improves the
sustainability of rangeland management (Quaas et al. 2007).
4.1 The ecological-economic system
The essential funds for this system are the the climate (fund F1), the vegetation of
palatable grasses (fund F2), the population of livestock (fund F3), and the farmer’s
household (fund F4). The essential services are precipitation (s1
12), livestock feed (s2
23),
grazing pressure (s3
32), stocking or destocking of livestock (s4
43), and the ecosystem ser-
vices provided by the livestock that yield the farmer’s income (s5
34). Figure 2 illustrates
the funds and how they are interrelated by the services they provide. The essential
human action in this ecological-economic system is the grazing management strategy x.
It directly determines the stocking or destocking of livestock and, thus, the production
of farm income. It also indirectly governs the way in which livestock grazing aﬀects the
18Ecological-economic system E
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Figure 2: Funds and services in the example of the semi-arid rangeland system.
vegetation dynamics and how forage is being produced by the vegetation.
The analysis is based on an integrated dynamic and stochastic ecological-economic
model which captures essential aspects and principles of grazing management in semi-
arid regions.9 Uncertainty is introduced into the model by the stochasticity of the service
rainfall, s1
12(t) = r(t), which is assumed to be a log-normally distributed random variable





The key feature of the grazing management strategy is that in dry years the whole
pasture is used, while in years with high rainfall a pre-speciﬁed fraction of the pasture
is rested. Whether resting takes place, and to what extent, are the deﬁning elements of
what we call the farmer’s grazing management strategy: A grazing management strategy
x = (γ,r) is a rule of which fraction of the pasture is not grazed in a particular year
given the actual rainfall in that year, where γ ∈ [0,1] is the fraction of pasture rested if
rainfall exceeds the threshold value r ∈ [0,∞). This rule determines the fraction g(t) of
9The details of the model and its analysis are described in Quaas et al. (2007).
10The dynamics of the fund ‘climate’, F1 is not explicitly modeled.





1 if r(t) ≤ r (no resting)
1 − γ if r(t) > r (resting)
, (9)
which constitutes the impact (s3
32) of the fund ‘livestock’ (F3) on the fund ‘vegetation’
(F2).
We describe the fund F2 ‘vegetation’ by two stock variables: the reserve biomass and
the green biomass of a representative grass species. While the green biomass f1
2(t) =
G(t), which serves as feed for the livestock, captures all photosynthetic (‘green’) parts
of the plants, the reserve biomass f2
2(t) = R(t) captures the non-photosynthetic reserve
organs (‘brown’ parts) of the plants below or above ground. The internal dynamics of
the stock of reserve biomass is described by













where wR is a growth parameter and d is a constant intrinsic death rate of the reserve
biomass. A density dependence of reserve biomass growth is captured by the factors
containing the capacity limits K: the more reserve biomass, the slower it grows. The
variable s3
32 = g captures the impact of grazing on the stock of reserve biomass. The
parameter c (with 0 ≤ c ≤ 1) describes the amount by which reserve biomass growth is
reduced due to grazing pressure.
The amount G(t) of green biomass available in year t after the end of the growing
season depends on rainfall r(t) in the current year, on the reserve biomass R(t) and on
a growth parameter wG:
G(t) = wG · r(t) · R(t). (11)
The fund livestock, F3, is described by the herd size f3
3 = S(t) that is kept on the farm
at time t. This herd size is limited by total available forage. We normalize the units
of green biomass in such a way that one unit of green biomass equals the need of one
livestock unit per year. Thus, in any period available green biomass on the farm, G(t),
determines the maximum number of livestock that can be held on the farm. In general,
the farmer will not stock up to this carrying capacity in every year. Rather, the herd
20size kept on the farm in period t is given by
S(t) = g(t) · G(t) . (12)
That is, stocking s4
43 = S(t), is determined by the total green biomass available on
the fraction of pasture used for grazing (i.e. not rested) in that year. For the sake
of the analysis, we assume that the farmer can exactly adapt the actual herd size to
the available forage and to his chosen grazing management strategy.11 Accordingly,
the service livestock feed equals the amount of green biomass used by grazing, s2
23 =
g(t)G(t).
The farm household, fund F4, receives an income, s5
34 = y(t), from the products of
the livestock, fund F3. For simplicity we assume that this income equals the herd size
S(t) kept on the farm in year t,
y(t) = S(t). (13)
Since the herd size S(t) is a random variable, income y(t) is a random variable, too.
As in Quaas et al. (2007), we will only consider ‘eﬃcient’ strategies that yield the
minimal standard deviation of income for a given mean income. These are given by









for all r ∈ [0,∞), (14)
where f(r) is the log-normal probability density function. In the following, strategies are
simply denoted by γ∗, implying that they are eﬃcient in that they fulﬁll Condition (14).
To summarize, the ecological-economic system (sensu Deﬁnition 1) is given by
• the funds climate F1, without explicit representation, vegetation F2, represented
by the stocks of green biomass f1
2 = G(t) and reserve biomass f2
2 = R(t), livestock
F3, represented by the herd size f3
3 = S(t), and the farmer’s household F4, also
without explicit representation
11Hence, the herd size S(t) does not follow its own dynamics, but it is determined by precipitation
and the chosen strategy.
21• the services precipitation s1
12 = r, livestock feed s2
23 = g G, grazing pressure s3
32 =
g, stocking s4
43 = g, and income s5
34 = y,
• the project ‘grazing management strategy’ x = γ∗ subject to eﬃciency condi-
tion (14),
• the dynamic allocation mechanism described by Equations (8), (10), (11), (12)
and (13).
4.2 Viability as a criterion of strong sustainability
In order to assess the viability of diﬀerent grazing management strategies we consider
their impact on the ecological stock ‘reserve biomass’, R, and the economic service
‘income’, y. By requiring the viability of an ecological (stock) variable and an economic
(service) variable, we consider a criterion of strong sustainability here. According to
Deﬁnition 2, a grazing management strategy is viable if these two quantities exceed
given thresholds ( ¯ R and ¯ y) with probabilities greater than given probability thresholds
(p and q) over a given time horizon T. Formally, the strategy γ∗ ∈ [0,1] is viable if and
only if for given ¯ R,p, ¯ y,q, and T,
Prob[R(t) ≥ ¯ R] ≥ p and Prob[y(t) ≥ ¯ y] ≥ q for all t ∈ [0,T] . (15)
Figure 3 illustrates how the viability of diﬀerent strategies (described by the fraction of
resting γ?) depends on the probability thresholds, p and q, and the time horizon, T. The
ﬁgure shows the probabilities that given levels of the stock of reserve biomass ( ¯ R = 1000,
left) and the service income (¯ y = 350, right) are reached over diﬀerent time horizons
(T ∈ {1,10,40,70,100}) for diﬀerent (eﬃcient) grazing management strategies. In the
example shown in Figure 3 a strategy γ? is viable for a time horizon T if the probability
Prob[R(T) ≥ ¯ R] is higher than p = 0.7 and if the probability Prob[y(T) ≥ ¯ y] is higher
than q1 = 0.7 or q2 = 0.5, as examples of a high and a low probability threshold,
respectively.12
12It is suﬃcient to consider the probabilities at the end of the time horizon here, because under the














































































Figure 3: The probabilities that given levels of the stock of reserve biomass ( ¯ R = 1000,
left) and the service income (¯ y = 350, right) are reached at diﬀerent points in time (T ∈
{1,10,40,70,100}) for diﬀerent (eﬃcient) grazing management strategies, described by
the fraction of resting. The parameters for the calculations were µr = 1.2, σr = 0.7,
d = 0.15, wG = 1.2, wR = 0.2, c = 0.5, R0 = 2400, K = 8000.
According to Deﬁnition 3, the viability set is given by the set of all strategies γ?
for which the curve for the time horizon under consideration in Figure 3 lies above the
horizontal lines depicting the probability thresholds under consideration.
For the high probability threshold q2, the viability set is empty for long time horizons
(T ≥ 70), because the probability that the threshold level ¯ y of income is exceeded is
smaller than the required probability threshold q2 for all strategies γ∗.
For a comparatively short time horizon of T=40 the viability set is small when
probability thresholds for both reserve biomass and income are high. The reason is that
viability with regard to the economic criterion ‘income’ requires a grazing management
strategy with little resting. In the example, less than about 75% of the pasture has to
be rested to exceed the threshold level ¯ y of income with a probability of at least q2 for
a time horizon of T=40. By contrast, viability with regard to the ecological criterion
‘reserve biomass’ requires a substantial amount of resting. In the example, more than
that at the end of the time horizon it holds that Prob[R(T) ≥ ¯ R] > p and Prob[y(T) ≥ ¯ y] > q.
23about 74% of the pasture has to be rested to exceed the threshold level ¯ R of reserve
biomass with a probability of at least p for a time horizon of T=40. Only strategies
fulﬁlling both the economic and the ecological criterion at the same time are viable. In
the example, these are only the strategies with fractions of resting between 74% and
75%.
For the low probability threshold of q1 = 0.5 the viability set is non-empty also for a
very long time horizon. Interestingly, a certain minimal amount of resting is necessary
for the viability with regard to the economic criterion ‘income’, too. The reason is that

























































































Figure 4: The probability that given levels ¯ R = 700 of the stock of reserve biomass
(solid lines, left axis) and ¯ y = 450 of the service income (dashed lines, right axis) are
reached for diﬀerent time horizons T and for two strategies, γ? = 0.75 and γ? = 0.70.
Other parameters are as in Figure 3.
Figure 4 shows that it depends on the time horizon which of the two strategies is
24more viable according to Deﬁnition 5.13 This ﬁgure shows the probabilities that the stock
reserve biomass ( ¯ R = 700) and the service income (¯ y = 450) exceed given thresholds for
diﬀerent time horizons T and for two strategies, one with a smaller fraction of resting
than the other (γ? = 0.70 vs. γ? = 0.75). The degree of viability v(γ∗) for each of the
two strategies γ∗ = 0.70 and γ∗ = 0.75 is given by the smaller of the two probabilities
that the stock reserve biomass and the service income exceed their respective threshold
values. Hence, in the ﬁgure, the degree of viability for each strategy can be read oﬀ
as the lower of the solid and dashed lines for this strategy. For the strategy with more
resting (γ? = 0.75, red lines), the degree of viability is simply the probability that the
service income exceeds the threshold ¯ y, v(γ? = 0.75) = Prob[y ≥ ¯ y] (dashed line), as
this probability is smaller than the probability that the stock reserve biomass exceeds
the threshold value ¯ R (solid line) for all time horizons T. This expresses that with high
resting viability is for all time horizons limited by the income criterion.
In contrast, for the strategy with less resting (γ? = 0.70, blue lines), the degree of
viability is given by the the probability that the service income exceeds the threshold ¯ y
(dashed line) for short time horizons T ≤ 50, and by the the probability that the stock
reserve biomass exceeds the threshold ¯ R (solid line) for long time horizons T > 50.
Hence, v(γ? = 0.70) =Prob[y ≥ ¯ y] for T ≤ 50, and v(γ? = 0.70) =Prob[R ≥ ¯ R] for
T > 50. This expresses that with little resting in the short term viability is limited by
the income criterion, while in the long term viability is limited by the reserve biomass
criterion.
Comparing the two strategies in terms of their degree of viability, Figure 4 shows
that v(γ? = 0.70) > v(γ? = 0.75) for T ≤ 58 , i.e. the strategy with a small fraction of
resting (γ? = 0.70, blue lines) is more viable than the strategy with a large fraction of
resting (γ? = 0.75, red lines) for short time horizons, while v(γ? = 0.75) > v(γ? = 0.70)
for T > 58 , i.e the strategy with a large fraction of resting is more viable than the
strategy with a small fraction of resting for long time horizons.
For given viability criteria ( ¯ R,p, ¯ y,q,T) one can classify whether a strategy γ∗ is vi-
able or not (Deﬁnition 2). One can also take the reverse perspective and ask, under what
13Of course, this also depends on the threshold values ¯ R and ¯ y.
25viability criteria is a given strategy γ∗ viable? Figure 5 illustrates the answer to this
question for the example of the strategy γ? = 0.70 considered already in Figure 4. This
strategy is viable over a time horizon T = 40 for all ( ¯ R,p, ¯ y,q) with the combination
( ¯ R,p) of the threshold level for the stock of reserve biomass and the corresponding prob-
ability threshold to the south west of the green line (Figure 5, left) and the combination
(¯ y,q) of the threshold level for the service income and the corresponding probability
threshold to the south west of the blue line (Figure 5, right).
We see that the strategy under consideration, γ? = 0.70, is viable over the time
horizon T = 40 for many diﬀerent combinations of thresholds ¯ R and ¯ y in the physi-
cal quantities and corresponding probability thresholds p and q: for instance, a viable
strategy is still viable under a lower threshold in the service or stock and a higher corre-
sponding probability threshold. This is a property of the particular system dynamics of


























































Figure 5: The strategy γ? = 0.70 is viable over a time horizon T = 40 whenever
the combination ( ¯ R,p) of the threshold level for the stock of reserve biomass and the
corresponding probability threshold is to the south west of the green line (left) and the
combination (¯ y,q) of the threshold level for the service income and the corresponding
probability threshold is to the south west of the blue line (right). The parameters are
as in Figure 3.
managed semi-arid rangelands. We conjecture that such a relationship exists for many
26reasonably well behaved systems. Nevertheless, in deﬁning viability we believe that it
is reasonable and useful to separate the thresholds in the level of physical quantities
(stocks and services) and in the probabilities: the threshold in the quantities has to be
set according to society’s value judgments on these quantities while the thresholds in
the probabilities have to be set according to society’s valuation of risks. In line with
the logic of strong sustainability, one could argue that these judgments should be made
separately.
5 Conclusion and discussion
In this paper, we have developed a general formalization of ecological-economic systems
as stochastic dynamic networks of funds and services. To this end, we have generalized
the framework of Arrow et al. (2003) in two respects. First, in addition to consid-
ering diﬀerent natural and economic (capital) stocks, we have explicitly included the
various services rendered by ecological and economic funds. Second, we have included
uncertainty about the future development of the system.
Based on this formalization of ecological-economic systems, we have conceptualized
strong sustainability under uncertainty as ecological-economic viability. In particular,
we have developed a unifying and general concept of viability that encompasses the
traditional ecological and economic notions of viability – continued existence of funds
and of services, respectively – as special cases. This concept of ecological-economic
viability provides an operational criterion of strong sustainability under conditions of
uncertainty.
Our analysis yields several insights into the normative prerequisites for, and the im-
plications of, demanding strong sustainability when future development is uncertain.
First of all, our formal deﬁnition of ecological-economic viability clariﬁes conceptually
what has to be speciﬁed in order to assess whether a project is sustainable or not. It
thereby highlights the diﬀerent normative judgments that necessarily enter a sustain-
ability assessment under conditions of uncertainty. In particular, the following questions
have to be answered:
271. What should be sustained? – The answer to this question speciﬁes the selection
of relevant stocks fh
i and services sk
ij.
2. At what level? – The answer to this question speciﬁes the threshold levels ¯ fh
i and
¯ sk
ij at which the selected stocks and services shall be maintained.
3. For how long? – The answer to this question speciﬁes the time horizon T.
4. To what extent of (un)certainty? – The answer to this question speciﬁes the
probability thresholds ph
i and qk
ij, i.e. the minimum probabilities with which the
selected stocks and services shall be maintained above their respective threshold
levels.
This emphasizes that viability is not a purely objective property of some system that
could be determined on purely scientiﬁc grounds, as it appears to be in some ecological
applications. Rather, viability is a normative criterion speciﬁed for a given ecological-
economic system, reﬂecting societal norms and values.
Second, our analysis shows that strong sustainability under conditions of uncertainty
cannot be as ‘strong’ as it is appears to be under certainty. Under uncertainty, it is in
general not possible to maintain all relevant stocks of natural capital with 100% proba-
bility because the stocks may decline by chance irrespectively of management activities,
for example because of a stochastic event such as an earthquake or volcano eruption.
Therefore, from an ex-ante perspective a given project leads to an ex post sustainable
outcome only with a probability which is in general less than one. In other words, even
a project that is considered viable ex ante may actually turn out to be unsustainable
ex post. It is for this reason that an ex-ante sustainability criterion under uncertainty
necessarily has to be weaker than under certainty. The probabilities that selected funds
and services are maintained above given threshold values lead to a continuous measure
of sustainability, i.e. the degree of viability. In order to make an unambiguous statement
as to whether a project is sustainable (i.e. viable) or not, it is necessary to deﬁne also
thresholds for these probabilities.
Third, as a viability assessment should provide guidance for societal choices and pol-
28icy making towards sustainability under uncertainty, it is important that the underlying
criterion is plausible, transparent and operational. We believe that the formalization
and deﬁnition of viability developed in this paper exactly fulﬁlls these desiderata, as
the deﬁnition of thresholds is a process that is easily accessible for public debate and
communication between scientists, policy makers and the public.
Fourth, taken as a criterion of societal choice, the viability criterion by itself will,
in general, not yield unique recommendations, as several projects may turn out to be
viable. Therefore, a sustainability assessment based on the viability criterion may be
complemented by a cost-beneﬁt analysis. Among the many viable projects one may
choose the one that generates the highest net beneﬁt. In this approach, cost-beneﬁt
analysis would not be used to choose among all feasible projects but only among the
viable ones (‘tolerable window’). In other words, viability is taken as a constraint
on net-beneﬁt maximization. This procedure yields what may be called the ‘optimal
sustainable’ project.
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Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
To proof that Condition (6) is necessary for viability, consider a project x ∈ X that is





















i∈I,j∈J, where G,I,J ⊆ {1,...,n}, H ⊆ {1,...,l},
K ⊆ {1,...,m}, and time horizon T. By Deﬁnition 2 of viability, this implies that








































































which is the necessary condition stated in the lemma (Equation 6).
To proof that Condition (6) is not suﬃcient for viability, consider the following
counter example of a project x ∈ X that fulﬁlls Condition (6) but is not viable. In
an ecological-economic system with l = 1, i.e. one single stock variable character-
izing all funds, so that the index h can be suppressed, the viability analysis is in
terms of G = {1,2}, H = {1}, I,J,K = ∅ over some time horizon T with thresh-
olds ¯ f1, ¯ f2 and corresponding probability thresholds p1 = 0.1 and p2 = 0.4. The dy-
namic allocation mechanism is such that project x leads to Prob






f2(t) ≥ ¯ f2










f2(t) ≥ ¯ f2
	
t∈[0,T] = min{0.2,0.3} = 0.2
> min{p1,p2} = min{0.1,0.4} = 0.1 ,
so that Condition (6) is fulﬁlled. Yet, project x is not viable as
Prob

f2(t) ≥ ¯ f2

= 0.3 < p2 = 0.4 ,
which violates Condition (2) in Deﬁnition 2 of viability.
30A.2 Proof of Lemma 2














Similarly, consider any k ∈ K, i ∈ I, j ∈ J and t ∈ [0,T]. Again, by Deﬁnition 5 and














Because Conditions (A.18) and (A.19) hold for all (g,h,i,j,k) ∈ G × H × I × J × K
and all t ∈ [0,T], project x is viable in the sense of Deﬁnition 2.
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